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Abstract. The rapid urbanization policies that are re-crafting Rio de Janeiro as a world mega-event venue are 
dramatically altering the socio-economic and security landscape of the city, and in particular, its favela com-
munities (informal settlements or slums). These changes focus on economic expansion, are driven by private 
investment partnerships, are supported through neoliberal governmental policy, and facilitated by a military 
paciication campaign. Many interventions result in the displacement and destabilization of favela residents. 
However, there are also some opportunities beginning to open up to create resilient and productive spaces 
inside these over-stressed communities, particularly in the area of food and nutrition security. This paper 
describes some of these key initiatives, and how they are impacting on the social landscape of favela 
residents.
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1. Introduction
Almost twelve million people live in the larger 
metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. More than six 
million people live inside the municipality. One in 
ive (1.4 million) live in dense urban favelas (in-
formal settlements or slums), and the numbers are 
increasing.[1] Decades of rapid urbanization, neglect, 
poverty, violence, displacement, and deicient public 
services and infrastructure has brought great hard-
ship and insecurity to favela residents, many of 
whom have lived under the control of drug-trafick-
ing gangs since the late 1970s. 
With Rio’s successful bid to host the 2014 World 
Cup and 2016 Olympics, key advisors to the State 
concluded that Rio needed to take military control of 
strategically located favelas—those in close proxim-
ity to wealthy neighborhoods, tourist areas, sports 
venues, and transportation routes.[2] As a conse-
quence, the Unidade de Polícia Paciicadora (Police 
Paciication Unit or UPP) public security campaign 
was formed.[3] The ‘paciication’ has two goals—
irstly to take control of favela territory, and secondly 
to reconstruct social order. To date, the UPP have es-
tablished military units in 38 of Rio’s inner-city fave-
las. Most others, those that are of little consequence 
to the city’s urbanization plans, remain under the 
control of criminal militias and gangs. 
Urban revitalization through sustainable economic 
development is foundational to the neoliberal goals 
the UPP facilitates. According to the municipality, 
these goals meet at the nexus of good governance ; 
public, private, and third sector partnerships (PPPs) ; 
and citizen participation.[4] Aligning with these 
goals, a series of micro-scale food security initiatives 
have been established in the favelas through a range 
of PPPs. Others have developed independently as a 
result of increased mobility that allows more luid 
travel to, from and between paciied favelas and the 
asfalto (formal city).
With 96.7 % of the the state population living in ur-
banized areas and 3,764 family farmers active in the 
region[5], urban agriculture (UA) as a sustainable 
economic platform for the urban poor, is already a 
growing sector for investment, growth, and jobs. 
Within the favelas, UA investments have been small, 
nevertheless, food security initiatives remain one of 
the few programs that have been facilitated in some 
way by the presence of the UPP. This paper aims to 
describe how these projects are manifesting under 
these circumstances. Speciically, it assesses the po-
tential viability of UA, and if it is a practical means 
for enhancing the quality of life of favela residents.
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2. Methodology
A range of intergenerational participants, representatives 
from Residents’ Associations, civil society organizations, 
municipal-level stakeholders and project beneiciaries were 
interviewed during the course of gathering information for 
this paper. Research was conducted through Green My Favela 
(GMF), a not-for-proit environmental restoration project and 
action research network that engages with favela residents, as 
well as public, private and third sector collaborations to es-
tablish gardens and facilitate sustainability initiatives in the 
favelas of Rio. A great deal of time has been spent working in 
collaboration with Rio’s Municipal Department for the 
Environment’s Hortas Cariocas program, which spearheads 
two of the projects detailed in this report. 
Fieldwork was undertaken in three favelas between 
November 2010 and March 2015. These favelas were chosen 
for this comparative study because of the relative ield vari-
ances they offer. Each favela has been paciied for a different 
length of time, and each is markedly different in its geograph-
ical, socio-economic, and security context. The size and ap-
proach of the food security projects also varies in each case. 
The projects take place in three paciied favela complexes or 
clusters of more than one community :
(i) Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira, two small higher-
income earning favelas located in the afluent South 
Zone neighborhood of Leme (paciied in 2008/9). 
107 UPP oficers oversee 3,740 residents—one for 
every 37 residents.[6] 
Previously under control of the Terceiro Comando 
(TC) drug traficking gang.
Projects : Favela Organica—an independent food re-
use enterprise launched by a favela resident ; and
Rio’s Sustainable City project—a short-term public/
private partnership (PPP) initiative that trained resi-
dent volunteers in domestic-scale food production and 
micro-entrepreneurship.
(ii) Borel/Formiga, a middle-income North Zone clus-
ter of favelas located in the middle-class neighborhood 
of Tijuca (paciied in in 2010). 
500 UPP oficers oversee 12,815 residents—one for 
every 33 inhabitants.[7]
Previously under control of the Comando Vermelho 
(CV) and the Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) drug trafick-
ing gangs. 
Project : Hortas Cariocas—a mid-size food garden 
supported by the Municipal Department for the 
Environment.
(iii) Manguinhos, a large, poor North Zone cluster of 
ten to ifteen favela neighborhoods (paciied in 2012). 
588 UPP oficers oversee 32,000 residents—one for 
every 60 residents.[8]
Previously under control of the CV drug traficking 
gang.
Project : Hortas Cariocas—a large-scale food farm de-
veloped as a PPP. 
Though this paper recognizes that Rio’s urbanization and 
public security policies facilitate and advance a very speciic 
economic development agenda that impacts tremendously on 
favelas, it is beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinize these 
policies. As it analyses only three of 38 paciied areas, the 
study is also limited in its ability to generalize about the im-
pact of UA on favelas as a whole. Rather, its intent is to pro-
vide an overview of how food security initiatives are being 
established within a paciication landscape, and to assess the 
viability of, and challenges associated with establishing vari-




The Babilônia and Chapéu favelas are wedged into the steep 
mountainsides at the back of the wealthy neighborhood of 
Leme, located at the far end of Copacabana beach, one of the 
most popular tourist destinations in Rio. These favelas have 
historically been the proving grounds for State interventions 
because of their small scale, their relatively low levels of con-
lict, and their spatial and social proximity to many of those 
who draft the public policies implemented in them. These 
favelas have the best socio-economic indicators among the 
three areas analyzed in this paper. 75 % of residents are 
homeowners who live with a well-developed infrastructure, 
including almost complete access to water, sewage and gar-
bage collection. The neighborhoods rate high on the city’s 
overall Social Development Index[9], yet despite such high 
indicators, school enrolments are dropping and illiteracy re-
mains a problem, particularly in Babilônia, where 15.9 % of 
the population older than ifteen is illiterate.[10] These neigh-
borhoods have had one of the most harmonious relations be-
tween a traficking-dominated favela and the surrounding 
asfalto. Until the mid-2000s, drug-related conlicts were rare, 
however by 2005 exchanges of gunire between enemy gang 
factions had become frequent. 
The paciication of Chapéu and Babilônia took place in 
mid-2009. Shortly after the installation of the UPP in this 
neighborhood, a Babilônia resident by the name of Regina 
Tchelly founded the Favela Organica project. Favela 
Organica encourages the creation of community gardens and 
generates revenues from the reuse of the food produced in 
them. After attending a UPP-sponsored workshop, Tchelly 
sought government micro-funding to establish her venture. 
After being rejected, she launched it independently with 
startup funds of R$ 140 (US$ 45). Favela Organica became 
a remarkable success and is now replicated in several cities 
throughout Brazil. In Rio, it employs eleven women in total, 
all residents of Babilônia. The women work part-time to 
teach favela residents how to prepare meals by utilizing the 
rinds, peels, seeds, and stems of food items that are normally 
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discarded. Favela Organica offers more than 450 organic 
recipes based on the reuse of foods. In addition, Tchelly pre-
pares buffets for up to 200 people at a single event, and has 
traveled to Italy at the invitation of Slow Food International 
to present recipes to large audiences. 
In Tchelly’s case, as is the case generally in Brazil, micro-i-
nancing is rarely available to the informal sector. Though 
microinance institutions have proliferated in recent years, 
primarily through Bancos do Povo (People’s Banks) and 
Community Development Banks,[11] they tend to focus on 
short-term proitability and inancial results over the creation 
of social ties and social capital (the criteria typically associat-
ed with solidarity inancing). Thus they are limited in their 
ability to extend or respond to the informal economy.[12] 
Tchelly’s project exposes a serious deiciency in Brazil’s 
microinancing system. It is also an example of how little 
capital is needed for the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) sector 
(those earning US$ 8 a day or less) to secure positive results 
given a good plan with low risks and costs. 
Figure 1. Sprouting starts on concrete laje, 2010.
In contrast to Tchelly’s independent project, a PPP domes-
tic-scale gardening program was launched in Babilônia in 
2011. This was a corporate-sponsored, social entrepreneur-
ship project developed as part of the Rio’s Sustainable City 
program, executed by the Brazilian Business Council for 
Sustainable Development and inanced by the Souza Cruz to-
bacco company. Altogether, around $ 3.5 million in sustain-
ability funding was injected into favela communities through 
private investment partnerships under this program over a 
two-year period.
The heavily publicized project coincided with the United 
Nations 2012 Rio+20 Sustainable Development Summit. Its 
stated goal was to bolster social entrepreneurship by training 
sixteen residents who volunteered for a ive-month period to 
learn agroecology techniques by establishing small food gar-
dens on their home terraces and lajes (concrete slab roofs). 
The trainees have since gone on to replicate the project in 
similar favela communities where built density is prohibitive 
to creating larger gardens. These training initiatives tend to 
come parceled into small, short-term packages that satellite 
around mega-events and market the city in a particular light. 
However, together with the other sustainability projects im-
plemented in this neighborhood, the project claims to have 
reached 40 % of households, or about 1,200 homes in total.
[13] 
Though limited in their reach, both Rio’s Sustainable City 
project and Favela Organica offer diverse approaches for de-
veloping food security initiatives inside favelas. Both demon-
strate the self-replicating potential of food security initia-
tives, and both interface with many aspects of the favela 
ecosystem. Beyond the possibilities of fortifying food and 
nutrition security, residents claim they possess an ability to 
catalyse peer-to-peer dynamics, contribute to a culture of 
purpose-oriented community life, promote environmental 
education, build useable skills, support capacity building, and 
aid in raising individual self-esteem. 
3.2 Tijuca
The Tijuca favelas are a cluster of seven communities located 
in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro. In terms of socio-eco-
nomics, they occupy the middle ground between Babilônia 
and Manguinhos. Complexo do Borel comprises of three 
communities. Formiga is another part of the favela cluster, 
located in a neighborhood close by. It is one of the smallest, 
oldest, steepest, and most populated favelas in the area. 
For the twenty years preceding paciication, armed conlict 
between the Tijuca favelas became so commonplace that it 
developed a scheduling arrangement where shootouts took 
place at agreed upon times. Because of the gang wars, the 
community ties that had historically linked the favelas to 
each other were critically injured. Faction disputes restricted 
residents’ mobility through enemy gang territories and spilled 
out to destabilize the surrounding asfalto neighborhoods. 
In mid-2010, military units entered Borel and Formiga and 
installed UPP oficers throughout seven Tijuca favelas. Due 
to the built density, the steep terrain, and the complex social 
geography, the UPP struggle to remain in control of this area 
as a whole. Because of its small size and relatively low levels 
of conlict, Formiga is considered to be the most successfully 
paciied of these communities.
A UA project run by the Municipal Department for the 
Environment’s Hortas Cariocas program has established ive 
food gardens throughout the Tijuca favelas—including one in 
Formiga.[14] The program works to build organic gardens 
with favela residents inside favelas and public schools.
Figure 2. Gardener Orlando Ribeiro (left) with Julio Barros, 
Director of Hortas Cariocas, 2012.
The Formiga garden was established in 2008 on a steep, 
terraced plot of land located under high voltage transmission 
lines. Socio-economic development, poverty alleviation, 
food and nutrition security, and the mitigation of erosion and 
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pollution, are just some of the beneits the garden brings to 
the community. It has also reduced informal housing devel-
opment and the dumping of trash on unoccupied land. 
Gardeners include the unemployed, retirees, ex-offenders, 
and individuals who have had previous involvement with 
drug traficking. By their own assessment, their levels of 
health and well-being have improved greatly since they be-
gan working on the allotment. 
The garden supervisor, Orlando Ribeiro, is one example of 
a former gang member transitioning to community gardener. 
Ribeiro cultivates a steady supply of vegetables, medicinal 
herbs, and eggs that are available at low cost to residents. 
Produce is fresher and more affordable than at the supermar-
ket, and as well as providing food at discount prices, the gar-
den donates to approximately twenty at-risk families, a pub-
lic school, and a local daycare center. The garden helps 
alleviate vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity which 
is prevalent because of the combination of two interrelated 
factors : the dificulty to access to fresh, affordable food due 
to low family income levels ; and the trend toward homoge-
nous eating habits which are generally low in nutritional 
value.
Hortas Cariocas gardeners are trained in agroecology and 
paid a stipend of R$ 480 (approximately US$ 130) per month 
to work full-time in the gardens. The program’s guidelines 
stipulate that half of all food produced must be donated to 
neighborhood schools and families with high social vulnera-
bility—as identiied by the local Residents’ Association. All 
other produce is either taken home or sold by gardners. Proits 
are divided or reinvested back into the garden. Gardeners also 
visit neighborhood day care centers and schools to teach chil-
dren about growing food, and give seeds and seedlings to 
children to grow food in their homes.
Hortas Cariocas is one of the few municipal-led, social 
development programs that aims to bring poverty alleviation 
to the people of these communities. Even so, the Social 
Development Index for this area remains disturbingly low 
(0.468).[15] Though UA plays only a minor role in social de-
velopment in Tijuca, it is critical to the sustainable develop-
ment landscape because it affects conlict dynamics and dir-
ectly impacts on the success and quality of urbanization and 
public security overall. 
3.3 Manguinhos
The Manguinhos Complex is a cluster of ifteen North Zone 
favelas inhabited by approximately 32,000 people. Enmeshed 
in a derelict fabric of government housing projects and aban-
doned factories that have been turned into ‘occupations,’ 
Manguinhos is geographically conined within a labrynth of 
congested highways, railway lines, and chronically polluted 
rivers that function as open sewers. Live, high voltage trans-
mission lines cut through its center. It is plagued by loods, 
urban waste and environmental toxins that aflict residents, 
and in particular youth, who are 500 times more likely to de-
velop cancer and neurological disorders because of exposure 
to high levels of lead that pollute the area.[16] 
The demographics and poverty indicators of Manguinhos 
are dismal. The Human Development Index is 0.65 %, among 
the ive lowest of Rio. 15 % of girls between the ages of if-
teen and seventeen have children. The monthly per capita 
income is R$ 188.00 (US$ 60). 20 % of residents survive on 
less than minimum wage, and unemployment rates languish 
between 30 %-50 %.[17]
Referred to as Rio’s ‘Gaza Strip,’ Manguinhos was until 
recently the site of the city’s largest crackolândia (crackland) 
and one of its most violent drug traficking centers. 
For decades, trafickers in conlict with rival factions and 
State military forces trapped civilians in a state of perpetual 
violence. All activities relating to the drug trade—sales, 
armed traficking, the consumption of crack cocaine, prosti-
tution, gang executions, and shootouts with Special 
Operations troops, took place openly and visibly in public 
space. Manguinhos was the deinitive example of an internal 
armed conlict and representative of Rio’s most chronic urban 
warfare issues.
In October 2012, State military forces invaded the favela 
with 1,300 troops, helicopters and tanks. Paciication has 
been brutal—characterized by disappearing infrastructure 
funds, forced relocations, violent protests, and a series of 
extra-judicial murders at the hands of the UPP. The ultimate 
goal of this paciication, as it is laid out in redevelopment 
plans, is to execute a series of public/private investment part-
nerships that aim to reshape the entire area leading up to 
Rio’s Maracanã sports stadium four kilometers away.
Following paciication, the city immediately bulldozed the 
kilometer-long strip of dilapidated land under the transmis-
sion lines where the crackolândia had been. R$ 500,000 
(US$ 165,000) was budgeted through federal and municipal 
funding to redevelop the area as a large-scale food garden. 
Hortas Cariocas spearheaded the project, which advanced in 
partnership with the private electric utility Light (which 
granted the legal right to use the land under the transmission 
lines) and the Manguinhos Residents’ Association (who ne-
gotiated between all stakeholders, including the CV gang, 
who still maintain inluence in the favela). 
The irst step was to excavate 700 truckloads (450 tons) of 
accumulated trash and debris from the site. A half-meter layer 
of contaminated surface soil was removed and replaced with 
gravel to increase drainage and prevent weeds. 300 garden 
beds were subsequently built and illed with fresh topsoil. 
Eleven water tanks were installed and connected to the city’s 
water supply. 
The Residents’ Association worked with Hortas Cariocas 
to hire more than 20 gardeners, some of whom were recover-
ing addicts. They were supplied with agroecology training, 
seeds, tools, and basic equipment, and have been growing 
enough food to take home two to three bags of produce a 
week to offset their monthly stipend since early 2014. In ac-
cordance with Hortas Cariocas guidelines, they must also 
distribute a percentage of produce to more at-risk members of 
the community, as well as local school lunch programs. 
Despite the improvements brought about by the garden, 
Manguinhos remains a dificult social space to navigate. 
Hortas Cariocas must negotiate with all stakeholders—in-
cluding trafickers and recovering addicts. This makes it a 
very ambitious program to manage. 
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Figure 3. Volunteer gardener in GMF section of Hortas 
Cariocas garden, Manguinhos.
A separate section of the garden was developed in collabo-
ration with the urban restoration project Green My Favela, 
who worked with residents to establish a community space 
with retirees, the underemployed, children, and families. A 
handful of volunteer residents cultivate and maintain 48, ten-
meter long garden beds. They receive no inancial renumera-
tion for their efforts, however, they set their own work hours, 
make all decisions about what is grown and how produce is 
distributed, help each other maintain their plots, and resolve 
their own interpersonal conlicts. They appreciate the garden 
as an aestheticised, productive, and therapeutic social space. 
The garden is open to the public and provides food for about 
100 favela residents free of charge. 
A range of fruits, vegetables, medicinal herbs, and season-
ings are grown year round. The produce has increased the 
amount of vegetables, and by extension, the nutrition intake 
consumed by its beneiciaries. The garden fulills an impor-
tant role in diversifying food habits and providing nutrients, 
especially vitamins and mineral salts, in which diets of favela 
residents are generally poor. Another beneit is that food is 
produced organically and thus is free from pesticides. 
Manguinhos can now boast that it is the site of the largest 
food garden (physically) in all of South America—a place 
where people gather on weekends to stroll through the space 
with their friends and families and collect free vegetables 
along the way.
What the garden in Manginhos demonstrates is that the so-
cial culture of favela living can change quickly if given 
enough support. Children and families are now able to walk 
out of their homes and into a garden instead of a crackolân-
dia. They congregate, work, play and socialize in clean, pro-
ductive, and safer public space. All this demonstrates the 
enormous potential that social infrastructure, and in particu-
lar UA, can have in the lives of favela residents. 
4. Challenges
With more than half of Brazil’s population still living on a 
monthly family income of less than US$ 150,[18] the need for 
poverty alleviation remains critical. Though Brazil has made 
tremendous strides in reducing food insecurity over the last 
several years,[19] almost 44 % of those receiving a quarter of 
the minimum wage or less still experience moderate to severe 
food insecurity. Those in this income bracket spend 29.8 % 
on food.[20] Diets consist almost exclusively of coffee, milk, 
bread, margarine, rice and beans, with half of all households 
going for approximately three weeks at a time without con-
suming vegetables or meats.[21] 
With 22 % of Rio’s residents living in overcrowded urban 
favelas under threat of eviction in substandard housing with-
out access to sewage,[22] and with public security and vio-
lence still critical problems, developing UA as a sustainable 
venture presents core challenges. Key issues that must be ad-
dressed by the municipality in order for it to advance effect-
ively include: 
(i) implementation of adequate solid and liquid waste 
management systems (including recycling options) 
that meet demographic capacity; 
(ii) formal designation of UA areas in Rio’s Municipal 
Master Plan; 
(iii) political recognition that UA is an integral to fave-
la development and an effective tool for developing a 
participatory and inclusive urban management 
structure; 
(iv) political recognition that UA is an essential com-
ponent to ighting poverty, creating self-reliant local 
food systems and chains, and cultivating a robust ur-
ban food supply; 
(v) support for bottom-up integration over top-down 
intervention;
(vi) installation of social infrastructure which bridges 
the inequality of resource access; 
(vii) a shift in paciication policy that funds social in-
vestment, not only military intervention;
(viii) the recognition that good and transparent gover-
nance is fundamental to all of the above.
There remain other barriers to developing food security 
and UA initiatives in Rio’s favelas. These include zoning re-
strictions, a lack of micro-funding, and the inability of the 
state to work effectively with informal communities. 
On a micro-level, there is an array of unevaluated health 
risks associated with cultivating food. In Manguinhos, for ex-
ample, bioaccumulators and other toxins generated from 
looding, the migration of chemicals from a nearby oil rein-
ery, garbage encroachment, and air release pollution from 
heavy trafic, leave the garden vulnerable to contamination. 
Recycled soil supplied by Comlurb (Rio’s garbage collection 
agency) used to replenish the beds contains large amounts of 
cut glass, and some smells so bad that gardeners will not use 
it. To date, there has been no testing undertaken to ascertain 
the dangers relating to any of these issues. 
Gardens are also under threat of being built over, unwit-
tingly destroyed by other municipal departments, at risk from 
land tenure insecurity, subject to luxes in public security, and 
being abandoned by residents who are disillusioned by some 
or all of the above. Gardeners may also leave a project to ac-
cept better paying work, or for reasons associated with ill-
health. As well, social dynamics are susceptible to interper-
sonal, traficking, and police conlicts, which can result in 
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intimidation, a lack of social cohesion, and diminished 
productivity. 
Rio claims it has structured the goals of its current 
Municipal Plan around the outcome document of the 2012 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.[23] 
If this is indeed the case, it must place poverty eradication as 
one of its most important objectives.[24] In this regard, UA 
can provide a multi-dimensional means with which to make 
improvements in social development by stimulating local 
economic growth and developing safe and productive public 
space. Thus far, however, there are no commitments to en-
gage in institutional reform whereby the poor have a voice in 
development decision-making, whereby the legal rights for 
citizens are provided for, whereby law enforcement is just (or 
will even continue in favelas after the 2016 Olympics), or 
whereby the processes of government are transparent.
Another complex challenge that is yet to be addressed 
within the social development paradigm, in general, is cogni-
tive depletion. Money can go a long way toward altering the 
dynamic that leads to willpower depletion among the poor. 
The impact of cash transfer programs and subsidies on bene-
iciaries’ wellness has been found to go beyond income sup-
port, to produce higher school enrollment rates, longer school 
progressions, and lower grade repetition. In the area of health, 
low birth weight, infant mortality, malnutrition and diarrhea 
has also been reduced,[25] along with the vulnerability of 
women, who are among the most at risk of poverty.[26]
Despite these successes however, studies suggest that at-
taching conditions to income subsidies—such as requiring 
beneiciaries to  go through a bureaucratic process in order to 
receive a monthly stipend—may further exhaust the already 
stressed decision-making capabilities of people living in 
poverty. Individual agency constrained by social inluences 
has also been shown to affect an individual’s capacity to be-
come an active agent of social change.[27] This may be one 
reason why government stipends do not necessarily lead to 
increased productivity, or why, in the right circumstances, 
gardeners can work productively without inancial 
renumeration. 
Behavioral scientist Eldar Shair asserts that living in 
poverty produces a psychology of “tradeoff thinking”[28] that 
leads to behaviors of “depletion and error.”[29] This is backed 
up by at least one economic study that suggests decision-mak-
ing in poverty is expensive at a cognitive level and can pro-
duce mental fatigue.[30] Therefore, it can be concluded that 
development approaches toward reducing poverty are more 
complex than efforts that just focus on access to health, edu-
cation, agriculture, and inances, and that certain cognitive 
functions must also be considered potentially depletable.
5. Potential beneits
The price of food in Brazilian cities continues to rise steadily, 
including in Rio, where in April 2015 alone, food staples rose 
by 4.51 %.[31] Programs with green socio-economic poten-
tial, such as organic agriculture, are particularly important for 
creating the enabling conditions to promote the BoP sector.
By 2010, almost $ 20 million of federal funds beneiting 
74,000 BoP recipients had been invested in the urban and 
peri-UA sector of Brazil.[32] Agroecology and organic agri-
culture is a growing subset of this sector, with 90,000 organic 
producers[33] active throughout the country—those not using 
pesticides, chemical feedstock or genetically modiied seeds 
or organisms. This whole-systems approach to local food 
production was bolstered by a three-year National Organic 
Production and Agroecology Plan (PLANAPO) that invested 
$ 4 billion into the agroecology sector through 2014.[34] 
Though this igure represents less than one-tenth of federal 
agribusiness subsidies, and though very little of this reached 
the favelas, it is nevertheless a substantial step toward 
strengthening the sector overall. 
There is a wealth of evidence that suggests that UA is an 
effective means not only for helping to alleviate poverty,[35] 
but for bringing social stability and therapeutic relief[36] to 
the residents of favela communities.[37] Other beneits of UA 
is that it can be delivered at a relatively low cost, while at the 
same time mitigating environmental risk and ecological scar-
city, all without expanding a development footprint. Gardens 
also can provide safer, cleaner, and more productive social 
space that can diminish feelings of lack, anxiety and stress. 
In favelas, UA has the potential to play an important role in 
changing the conventions that govern human interaction. As 
social institutions, these initiatives, if instituted properly, can 
function as devices for building social cohesion and bridging 
the gap between the formal and informal sectors. Cultivating 
therapeutic and safe space can also shift social norms away 
from feelings of deiciency and insecurity and toward civic 
involvement and the stewardship of public space. In addition, 
gardens are critically important for their ability to introduce 
youth to an alternative other than drug culture. UA also has 
the capacity to emerge as an important, yet restricted means 
with which to repair depleted ecosystem services, develop 
better food and nutrition security, stimulate job creation, and 
establish local, informal production and distribution chains. 
Non-clinical interventions such as gardening play a big 
part in helping to reduce the symptoms of anxiety, and restor-
ing drained willpower, through contact with nature.[38] In the 
favelas, gardeners claim that it is the therapeutic and stress 
relief beneits that are the most rewarding for them. Other 
residents claim that because these urban spaces grow out of 
remediating abused lands, it is access to clean, aestheticized, 
safe and peaceful space that is important, especially for the 
children and families. In the case of Manguinhos, the garden 
also provides a social alternative for youth, where once there 
was extraordinary violence. 
Above all, favela gardens have the potential to point to-
ward how to build participatory and inclusive networks, ad-
vance cooperation and respect between societal tiers, create a 
level of trust and conidence between individuals and organi-
zations that are unfamiliar to each other, and combat the like-
lihood of criminal violence and other forms of trust violation 
within the harshest of circumstances.
6. Conclusion
Despite the limits of UA as it currently exists in the favelas, 
these practices are suggestive of a municipal paradigm shift 
that at least partially recognises the beneits of agroecology 
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as a means for advancing social development, cultivating 
sustainability, realizing the right to food, and promoting in-
clusive citizenship. Though UA may not have the production 
capacity to fully meet the food security needs of favela resi-
dents, it does point a way to a better future for favela resi-
dents, one that offers an integrated way to build local, citizen-
centered, socio-economic platforms. It is an interface that 
brings together divergent actors, skills and experience, cul-
tural backgrounds, levels of education, objectives, social 
capital, and economic investment to cultivate more sustain-
able and ethical land use practices. 
UA is a cost-effective poverty alleviation tool that provides 
a framework for capacity building that connects to the areas 
of education, health, resource management, natural disaster 
mitigation, environmental recovery, and economic vitality. It 
is a replicable and scalable model that can be catalyzed inde-
pendently or exist in any number of PPP conigurations; that 
is suitable for integrating into the Municipal Master Plan to 
support existing sustainability and poverty eradication goals; 
and that is participatory in nature. 
Though it has tremendous potential, UA can also easily 
fail. Its informal roots and meager institutional support, 
framed in already tense and violent resource scarce environ-
ments, make it a precarious enterprise at best. For every gar-
den successfully established in the favelas, one becomes im-
perilled or fails. However, within smaller, less stressed favela 
contexts, with lower levels of conlict and higher levels of 
public security, success is more easily achievable. 
The UA programs discussed in this paper provide adapt-
able blueprints for working inside fragile communities, for 
reutilizing abandoned lands, for remediating degraded space, 
for increasing food and nutrition security, for generating in-
come, and for cultivating co-governance and citizen-manage-
ment. Moreover, it demonstrates how being able to freely 
visit, cultivate, or play in a garden is one of the most pro-
found and therapeutic experiences to be had living in a dense, 
urban favela. The ability to congregate in aestheticized, pro-
ductive public space, or stroll through a garden and pick pro-
duce to take home, is testimony to the enormous difference 
that food security programs are making in the daily lives of at 
least some residents living under paciication in Rio de 
Janeiro’s inner-city favelas.  
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